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European policy makers may have asked too much from regional policies: to decrease inequalities
between regions, to increase efficiency at the national and European levels and to decrease
inequalities between countries. This paper argues that these policies face a trade-off between equity
and efficiency at the spatial level. If the existence of positive localised spillovers and of returns to
scale explain the phenomenon of self-sustaining agglomeration, then agglomeration must have
some positive efficiency effects. We also argue that because infrastructure financed by regional
policies have an impact on transaction costs and therefore on the location decision of firms, the
long-term effect of certain regional policies may be unexpected and unwelcome. Policies that
finance infrastructure to reduce transaction costs on goods between regions lead to more
agglomeration but higher growth at the national level. We show that policies that reduce
agglomeration (transfers, financing of transport infrastructure inside the poor regions) may then also
reduce efficiency and growth. On the contrary, a policy that reduces the cost of innovation or
increases the diffusion of innovation reduces regional income inequality, agglomeration and
increases growth. 
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1. Introduction
Does trade and monetary integration in Europe entail the risk of widening inequalities between the
regions? To judge by the sums devoted to regional policies in Europe, which now account for one
third of the Community budget and form the second largest item after the Common Agricultural
Policy, the reply given by governments and the European Commission is clearly yes. The sharp
expansion in regional policy spending has taken place since the accession of Spain and Portugal.
This, following the admission of Greece, led to a widening of income disparities between the poor
and rich regions of what was then called the European Community. The negotiations on the
accession of the two Iberian countries resulted in an increase in the resources for regional policies
from ECU 3.7 billion in 1985 to ECU 18.3 billion in 1992. The figure will reach ECU 33 billion in
1999, equal to 0.45% of Europe’s GDP. These transfers represented up to 3% of GDP for some
countries of the Cohesion Group (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). The actual amounts spent
on regional policies in these countries were much larger as the EU requires that its transfers be
matched by national spending. National regional policies have also been very important in certain
countries such as France, Italy (the transfers to Mezzogiorno) and Germany (the transfers to the
New Länder). The enlargement of the European Union to the Central and Eastern European
countries, where per capita GDP levels are much lower than in the four Cohesion countries will
imply a major overhaul of European regional policies.
Compared with the scale of expenditure on these regional policies, the observer is struck by the
weakness of the conceptual framework used to justify them. It is scarcely a caricature of the
Commission’s position to portray this as a belief that transfers to the poorest European regions are
beneficial to them, bringing about a reduction in regional inequalities which in turn is bound to
benefit Europe as a whole. The inspiration behind regional policies is to be found in Article 130a
of the Treaty of the European Union, which speaks of “harmonious development” with the aim of
“reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions”. The justification is
not meant to be solely political. It is also economic, since the report says that “the disequilibria
indicate under-utilisation of human potential and an incapacity to take advantage of the economic
opportunities that could be beneficial to the Union as a whole”.
The economic reasoning underlying this thesis is not, however, clear. The neo-classical theory of
international trade tells us that a low level of productivity (a disadvantage in absolute terms) is no
impediment to benefiting from trade gains based on comparative advantages. Furthermore, the
neo-classical theory of growth with decreasing returns of scale predicts that trade integration and
liberalisation of capital movements will accelerate convergence: because of decreasing returns,
regions with low incomes and low availability of capital should, other things being equal, have a
high return on capital and this should therefore attract capital movements in an integrated area such
as the EU. Active policies to help the most disadvantaged regions cannot be justified in a neo-
classical framework of perfect competition and without economies of scale, since within such a
framework the process of integration should accelerate convergence between regions. 
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The new theories of economic geography and the new theories of endogenous growth – a common
feature of which is their emphasis on the importance of economies of scale, imperfect competition
and phenomena of localised spillovers – seem more appropriate. Contrary to the neo-classical
paradigm, the theories of endogenous growth do not predict convergence between rich and poor
regions even when movements of goods and capital are free: Indeed, by abandoning the
hypothesis of decreasing returns on capital, these models exclude the economic mechanism that
generates the process of convergence. Moreover, the recent models of geographic economics show
that regional integration, by reducing transaction costs between the regions, may lead to self-
sustaining inequality.
The new theories of economic geography and endogenous growth can therefore serve as a
conceptual framework for regional policies, since they offer explanations for self-sustaining
phenomena of regional inequalities. However, with its emphasis on the positive effects of local
spillovers and on economies of scale, this framework also implies that there are positive effects from
agglomeration and hence from regional inequalities (see Fujita and Thisse, 1996; Jayet, Puig and
Thisse, 1996). If economies of scale and localised spillovers explain phenomena of increased
regional inequalities, this necessarily implies that efficiency gains (in terms precisely of economies
of scale or spillovers) accrue from the existence of economic agglomeration. The existence of these
beneficial effects of agglomeration suggest rather that, in certain respects, Europe’s economic
geography is insufficiently agglomerated and specialised (for example in comparison with
American geography). It is therefore illogical to claim that the diminution of regional inequalities
supposedly facilitated by regional policies will generate efficiency gains at pan-European level. To
oppose concentration and geographical specialisation is also to renounce their beneficial effects. 
2. What links are there between efficiency and territorial equity?
2.1 A simple theoretical framework
To illustrate this tension between the countervailing effects of agglomeration – positive in terms of
efficiency, but potentially negative in terms of equity – I shall use a two-region theoretical scheme.
Firms can locate either in the capital-rich North region or in the South region. The geographical
concentration of firms in the rich region increases when transaction costs between the regions fall.
The logic (which is common to the new theories of international trade and to the models of
economic geography) is that it is always more profitable to produce in the richer area, the larger
market, in order to maximise the benefits of economies of scale. When transaction costs between
the regions fall, businesses can then exploit these economies of scale while also selling on the “small
market” which is less “protected” by high transaction costs. In addition, when regional inequality
in terms of income increases, regional inequality in terms of spatial distribution of firms (industrial
agglomeration) likewise increases, since economies of scale give firms an incentive to locate where
demand is strongest and income consequently highest. Equilibrium geography is such that the
profits of businesses are identical in both regions, which eliminates any incentive to relocate. This
equilibrium relationship (profits are equal in both regions) can be encapsulated in the following
relationship:
Equation No. 1:  A = A ( R ) ,
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w h e re A ( R ) is a growing function of R and where A is an agglomeration index (for example, the
ratio of the number of firms in the rich region to the total number of firms). R is an index of inequality
of regional incomes (for example, the ratio of income in the rich region to income in the poor region). 
Spatial concentration in turn has an impact on the rate of innovation and hence on the long-term
growth of the overall economy, because the cost of innovation in the richer region falls as the
agglomeration of economic activities increases.
Several reasons can be advanced. First, if the innovative sector uses manufacturing sector inputs,
its concentration will enable transaction costs and hence the cost of innovation to be reduced. In
this case, the positive externality arising from spatial concentration is pecuniar y, operating through
an effect on prices. Another possibility is the existence of localised technological spillovers such as
those studied by Jacobs (1969) and by Henderson and others (1995). For instance, the proximity
of numerous firms might enable the innovative sector greater scope for observing and analysing the
production process and thereby facilitate the creation of new production processes. Silicon Valley
is the most successful example of the effect of such interactions between producers and innovators
in a particular domain, that of information technology.
In both cases, geographical concentration of production activities increases opportunities to reduce
the cost of innovation and consequently to increase its rate of growth, with beneficial effects for the
territory as a whole. In endogenous growth models this is an equilibrium relationship, because
when the cost of innovation falls this induces new entrepreneurs/researchers to enter the innovation
market which is regarded as being competitive. This equilibrium relationship between the long-term
growth rate and the agglomeration index will be summed up by the following relationship: 
Equation No. 2:  g = g ( A ) ,
where g ( A ) is an increasing function of A, the index of industrial agglomeration.
The rate of innovation itself has an impact on regional income inequalities since a high rate of
innovation accelerates market entry by new businesses, which then compete with existing
businesses and hence reduce their profits. One effect therefore is to reduce existing incomes. From
this point of view, an increase in the rate of innovation reduces income disparities between regions
by reducing the profits of monopolistic firms, which are more numerous in a rich than in a poor
region. This last equilibrium relationship is summed up by the following relationship: 
Equation No. 3:  R = R ( g ) ,
where R ( g ) is a negative function of the growth rate g.
In Figure 1, which sums up these different equilibrium relationships, the upper part shows the spatial
equilibrium where income inequalities and industrial agglomeration are determined. The curve A A
shows that the phenomenon of agglomeration tends to increase when income inequalities increase,
because firms locate in markets with high purchasing power (Equation 1).
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Figure 1. Relationship between innovation, regional income inequalities and agglomeration
Innovation rate and
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The curve RR shows that when industrial agglomeration increases competition intensifies, thereby
tending to reduce the profits of monopolistic businesses and income inequality between regions
(Equations 2 and 3). The equilibrium level of agglomeration and the equilibrium level of income
inequality is indicated by the intersection of the two curves AA and RR. The lower part of the
graph shows how spatial equilibrium in its turn influences the rate of innovation. The equilibrium
level of agglomeration A is given by the spatial equilibrium. The curve SS shows the positive
relationship between innovation and agglomeration, due to the existence of localised spillovers
(Equation 2). The equilibrium rate of innovation and the equilibrium level of income inequalities are
indicated by the intersection of the line A and the curve SS.
2.2 What is the empirical link between efficiency and geographical equity in Europe?
Quah’s (1996) results suggest that there is indeed a trade-off between regional equity and a
country’s aggregate growth. He finds that, among the Cohesion group of countries (Greece,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, though there are no Irish regional data), the two countries that have
achieved a high rate of growth and converged in per capita income terms towards the rest of
Europe (Spain and Portugal) have also experienced the most marked regional divergence, Portugal
being the country to have exhibited the sharpest increase in regional inequalities. By contrast
Greece, which has a low growth rate and has not benefited from a tendency to converge with the
rest of Europe, has not experienced a rise in regional inequalities. A recent study by INSEE (1998)
shows also that the countries with a per capita GDP level above the European Union average also
experience above-average regional disparities.
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Another way of asking the question is to study the nature of the convergence process in Europe.
Taking Europe as a whole, a slow, long-run process of convergence does indeed exist between the
European regions (at NUTS2 level). Thus, Sala-i-Martin (1996) finds that, over a long period (1950-
1990), the average growth rates of the regions are negatively correlated with initial income. The
speed of convergence is 2%, meaning that on average 2% of the per capita income difference
between regions is eliminated and that it takes more than 30 years to eliminate half of the initial
income difference. 
Neven and Gouyette (1994), however, find that, over the more recent period starting in the 1980s
that has witnessed major advances in European integration, a process of divergence has been
appearing between regions of the North and the South. In addition, even a slow long-run
convergence at the European level may mask a process of regional divergence within countries. De
la Fuente and Vives (1995), for instance, building on the work of Esteban (1994), suggest that
around half the income inequality existing between the regions of the EU is accounted for by
domestic inequality between regions within individual countries. Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s
per capita income differentials have been narrowing between countries but widening between
regions within individual countries (Martin, 1998). This would suggest that Europe is experiencing
a process of convergence between countries simultaneously with one of divergence between
regions within individual countries. This possibility can be illustrated by the following Figure, where
each dot represents a region.
Figure 2. Pan-European convergence, local divergence
Per capita income
differentials have been
narrowing between
countries, but widening
between regions within
countries. 
Initial GDP
per capita
Country 1
Growth rate
Country 2
Country 3
In this example, there is indeed convergence between regions at European level, since the initially
poor regions tend to grow faster than the rich regions: A negative relationship does indeed exist
on average between growth rate and initial per capita GDP. However, no process of convergence
exists within each country. In fact, in country 1, the poorest, which is growing the fastest and
converging towards the others, there is a process of domestic regional divergence.
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These results seem therefore to suggest that the neo-classical growth model holds at country level
whereas a model of endogenous growth with elements of geographic economics holds for the
regions of individual countries; and that the economic mechanisms which generate increasing
returns, and hence the possibility of divergence, are therefore more powerful at local than at
national level. Several hypotheses can be advanced to explain this difference.
• Spillovers deriving from increasing returns are geographically limited phenomena, since they
depend on social interactions between individuals (1). 
• Migration may be the origin of agglomeration phenomena (see Krugman, 1991a,b) and, as is
known, labour migration is low between European countries on account of cultural and linguistic
barriers. 
• It is possible that transaction costs between regions within each country are much lower than
transaction costs between regions of different countries, notably because of the existence of an
exchange risk between countries which has only just disappeared with Monetary Union. The
empirical studies by Engel and Rogers (1996) on the “cost” of the frontier between the United
States and Canada seem to support this. They find that the frontier has the same effect, in price
change terms, as a domestic distance of nearly three thousand kilometres. 
3. Public policies, regional inequalities and growth
3.1 What can theory tell us?
Why is intervention necessary, that is to say why is market-driven geography not optimal? In the
first place, when firms decide where to locate they do not take into account the impact of this choice
on the well-being of immobile economic agents. From this point of view, equilibrium geography will
be too concentrated because people remaining in the disadvantaged region will be penalised both
as workers and as consumers. Secondly, in deciding where to locate, businesses will also not take
into account the positive effects of agglomeration on the rest of the economy, particularly the
innovation sector. From this point of view, market-driven geography will be insufficiently
concentrated in the sense that it will generate too low a rate of innovation and growth. There is
therefore a difficult choice between these two considerations which regional policies should take
into account.
Let us first assume that a simple monetary transfer is made from the rich to the poor region. In Figure
3, this transfer therefore produces a leftward shift of curve RR (for a given industrial geography, the
income inequality will be lower). The induced effect on the geography will be to weaken the
agglomeration phenomenon, since the increase in incomes in the poor region (and the diminution
of income in the rich region) will stimulate relocation of firms to the region that has relatively
increased its purchasing power. In the lower part of the graph, this decline in agglomeration is
reflected in a more dispersed economic geography less conducive to spillovers, and hence in a
lower growth rate.
1) The work of Jaffe, Trajenberg and Henderson (1993) shows that the citation and use of patents is very localised. This is
very strong evidence that knowledge spillovers are themselves very localised.
This suggests neo-
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Figure 3. Effect of a transfer to the South
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However, European regional policies aspire to be more than simple transfers. In fact, their objective
is to transform supply conditions. Thus some 30% of the Structural Funds is allocated to the financing
of infrastructure, largely transport infrastructure. This concentration on infrastructure expenditure is
justified by the Commission on the basis that inter-regional disparities in infrastructural terms are
more marked than inequalities in terms of income.
Within the analytical framework presented here, the main consequence of financing such public
infrastructure (particularly of the transport kind) is to reduce transaction costs. This is moreover the
paramount objective sought by the Commission, which wishes in this way to enable the poor regions
to benefit from the advantages of the Single Market. However, lowering transaction costs has a
widely differing impact on economic geography depending on whether the reduction is mainly in
costs within the region or between the regions (see Martin and Rogers, 1995 and Martin, 1999).
1. In the first case, a reduction in transaction costs within the poor region, by increasing the
effective local demand for locally produced goods, will have the consequence of attracting new
firms into this region. In Figure 4, this leads to a leftward shift of curve AA (given the same level
of income inequality, agglomeration diminishes).Industrial agglomeration has diminished to the
benefit of the poor region but this leads to a lower rate of innovation and greater income inequality
as businesses in the North, now facing less competition, increase their profits. Therefore it is not
certain that such a policy is to be recommended, whether from the standpoint of efficiency or equity.
This example may seem paradoxical, but it highlights the fact that industrial location inequality does
not always exactly mirror income inequality, since economic geography has an impact on the rate
of innovation which can itself influence income inequalities.
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Figure 4. Diminution of transaction costs within the poor region
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2. The exactly opposite effect occurs if regional policy tends to reduce transaction costs between the
two regions (2). The reason is that such a reduction offers firms an incentive to relocate to the
richer region where they can now benefit from economies of scale, while selling in the poor region
thanks to lower inter-regional transaction costs. This result recurs in numerous models of economic
geography (see in particular Krugman, 1991a,b). Thus this type of regional policy accentuates
the phenomenon of agglomeration; it thereby raises the long-term growth rate and brings down
income inequality since it reduces monopolistic business profits. The result may seem paradoxical
at first sight: facilitating access to a poor region may increase agglomeration. The example of
motorway building between northern and southern Italy, which was supposed to unlock the south
but has spurred agglomeration in the north, shows that this paradox is not a purely theoretical one
(see Faini, 1983). However, induced agglomeration is not necessarily unfavourable at the
national level insofar as the rate of innovation of the economy as a whole is boosted. There again,
the Italian example of a high rate of innovation in the North illustrates the positive impact of
agglomeration.
As can be seen from these examples, the effects of regional policies are rather complex and may
at times seem paradoxical. In all events the situation is fairly distant from the very simple logic of
regional policies based on the idea that transfers or infrastructure financing always favour the poor
regions and that this in turn is bound to benefit the country or Europe as a whole. 
In all the examples looked at, regional policy has an unfortunate consequence: a reduction in the
rate of growth (direct transfer), or the same effect coupled with an increase in income inequalities
(infrastructure financing within the poor region), or relocation of firms to the rich region (financing
2) The reduction in transaction costs within the rich region has the same effects, in our context, as a reduction in inter-regional
transaction costs.
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of infrastructure between the poor and the rich region). Hence, regional policies face a trade-off
between equity and efficiency. In the case of the Cohesion countries (and even more so in the future
for Eastern European countries), this suggests that it will be difficult to attain through these policies
the objective of higher national growth (and therefore fast convergence towards the rest of Europe)
and at the same time the objective of a decrease in regional inequalities. 
However, a policy aimed at reducing regulatory barriers to innovation or the costs of innovation makes
it possible simultaneously to achieve objectives of reducing regional inequalities and increasing the
rate of growth. The policies involved could be R&D subsidies, education infrastructure, lowering
barriers to entry on goods markets, making capital markets more conducive to new start-ups. 
In this case (Figure 5), it is the dynamic equilibrium (lower part of the graph) which is first affected.
A reduction in the cost of innovation tends to increase the rate of growth: The curve SS shifts
downwards (the rate of growth increases for a given level of agglomeration). By boosting
competition, this increases in the rate of innovation, reduces business profits and hence income
inequalities between the two regions. This induced effect means that spatial equilibrium is also
affected: The curve RR shifts leftward and industrial agglomeration in the rich region diminishes.
In the final equilibrium state, agglomeration and income inequality have diminished while the
growth rate has risen. The apparent paradox is therefore that the public policy which is least
“regional” in its application enables the regional policy objectives to be achieved. 
Figure 5. Effect of a reduction in the cost of innovation or of an increase in diffusion of innovation
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Another policy, closer to the traditional vision of regional policies, can also have the same effects.
As has been seen, infrastructural policies that reduce the inter-regional or intra-regional cost of goods
led either to a more unequal geography or to a decline in the rate of innovation. However, when
infrastructure-improvement policy focuses on lowering the cost of conveying information rather than
the cost of transporting goods, the effect is quite different: By fostering the effects of inter-regional
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spillovers, such a policy enables the rate of innovation for a given geography to be stepped up, since
the innovation sector benefits more from spillovers generated by geographically remote firms. These
policies would have the objective of increasing the capacity of poor regions to absorb new
technologies and to increase spatial diffusion of innovation. This could be done by financing
i n f r a s t ru c t u re in telecoms and in education. The impact is then similar to that illustrated in Figure 5.
Finally, we have seen that the main equity consideration justifying the objective of regional policies
to counter agglomeration is the existence of immobile economic agents who are penalised by the
concentration of economic activities. The fact that mobility (both between regions of a given country
and between countries) is much lower in Europe than in the US explains why the location of
economic activities has become a policy issue only on this side of the Atlantic. From the regulatory
point of view, housing and tax policies that facilitate their mobility should therefore be regarded
wholly as regional policies. The fact that regions can be specialised in specific industries also
suggests that low inter-sectoral mobility of workers adds to the welfare cost of spatial concentration.
This suggests that policies that facilitate inter-sectoral mobility such as education and training
policies should be reinforced. 
3.2 The effect of regional policies: Empirical results
De la Fuente and Vives (1995) have obtained results that are somewhat disappointing for regional
policies as applied to Spanish circumstances. They find that the contribution made by public
investment to regional convergence of incomes was small, accounting for around 1% of the
inequality reduction during the 1980s. The Commission (1996) used macroeconomic input-output
models and found that, in the absence of the structural and cohesion funds, GDP growth in the four
Cohesion group countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) would have been 1/2% lower than
the actual outcome. It must be stressed that these numerical estimates focus on the positive short term
Keynesian effect on local demand and not on the long-term supply effects. Moreover, they tell us
nothing about the effects on convergence between regions within a given country. Finally, the bias
that local policy makers have in favour of large infrastructure projects (especially transport
infrastructure) can certainly be explained by these positive short term effects on local demand and
output. It is however important to stress that in the case of infrastructure that lowers the cost of
transaction between regions (such as highways) the long term location and supply effect is negative
for the poor region and therefore exactly inverse to the short-term positive impact. Hence, relying
on results that emphasise short-term demand effects can be misleading.
Combes and Lafourcade (1999) indeed find that the decrease of transport costs in the last 20 years
has indeed led to more agglomeration. Martin (1998), using data on regional stocks of
infrastructure (transport, telecommunications, energy, and education) finds that, if the regional
growth regressions are linked to these stocks, the speed of convergence across regions in Europe
increases for telecommunications infrastructure. Thus, if the telecommunications infrastructure had
been similar in all the regions of Europe, the speed of convergence (that is to say, the average
annual percentage reduction in the inter-regional income gap) would have been 4.1% as against
an actual 1.3% over the period 1978-1992. Calculated on transport infrastructure, the speed of
convergence would have been 2%. These figures cannot, however, be interpreted as being very
promising for the effects of regional policies. All in all the gain is fairly small in terms of
Volume 4 No 2  1999 21EIB Papers 
convergence and must be set against the huge cost of an infrastructural programme that would
equalise infrastructure stocks between the European regions. Above all, when the regressions are
carried out for the regions of an individual country, it is found that, with the exception of
communications infrastructure, stocks of public infrastructure have no significant impact on the
speed of convergence between the regions within a given country. It will be noted that the positive
effect on the convergence of communications infrastructure is consistent with the theoretical idea
presented here that a reduction in the cost of conveying information is theoretically more favourable
to regional equity than a reduction in the cost of transporting goods.
4. Conclusion 
A standard principle in economics is that with one policy instrument it is difficult - to say the least -
to attain different objectives. In some sense, European policy makers have asked too much from
regional policies: To decrease inequalities between regions, to increase efficiency at the national
and European levels and to decrease inequalities between countries. A key point of this paper, both
from a theoretical and empirical point of view, is that this may contradictory. Moreover, policy
makers often expect that transfers in the form of the financing of infrastructure will have both a
positive short-term demand effect and a positive long-term supply effect. The first one is quite
obvious and certainly contaminates the data and the debate on regional policies but because
infrastructure has an impact on transaction costs and therefore on the location decision of firms, the
long term supply effect on the region may be opposite to the short-term effect. 
This suggests that the objectives of regional policies need to be carefully redefined. First, if the
ambition of regional policies is to affect the long-term economic geography of Europe, then only
the supply effect should be considered in the allocation of funds. Second, policy makers should
decide whether their main objective is to decrease inequalities between the different countries and
therefore give priority to national growth and efficiency or to decrease inequalities between the
different regions inside countries and therefore to give priority to growth in poor regions and to
spatial equity.  This is a crucial political question in view of the enlargement to the East as these
countries have average incomes per capita that are much below those of the four Cohesion
countries and also have growing regional inequalities. 
A final point is that to justify public intervention a necessary (but not sufficient) condition is that a
market failure is clearly identified. In the case of economic geography, we have seen that the market
failure may come from the externality due to immobility of agents (firms do not take into account
the impact of their location choice on immobile private agents) and to the positive externalities
linked to technological spillovers (in this case the market driven geography may be insufficiently
agglomerated and specialised). Usually, the best policy is the one that intervenes at the source of
the externalities. In the first case, facilitating the interregional (and inter-industrial) mobility of
workers seems to be the most direct way to diminish the negative social impact of that spatial
externality. If workers were more mobile (both between regions and between sectors), they would
suffer less from the effects of the location decision of firms. Facilitating mobility is not very much
considered to be in the realm of regional policies but this should may be reconsidered especially
in view of the very small interregional mobility in Europe (compared to the US for example) and of
its social costs. The second externality comes from the fact that technological spillovers are
European policy should
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between different regions
inside countries.
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localised. Here, the aim of the public policy should be to make these spillovers less localised so that
they benefit the whole of Europe. This is however a very different policy than the one that consists
in the spatial dispersion of innovation activities. We have seen that theoretically, and to a certain
extent also empirically, this suggests that more emphasis should be put on the financing of
telecommunications and education infrastructure.
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